Report #0135.1 - Attacker deQzb Follow-up: Laundering Path to Coinbase and Ongoing SPL Token Seizures

This report is a follow-up to Report #0135.

Abstract

A follow-up on-chain investigation of the attacker wallet deQzbGSDA3U6bFmxAfWuJYhYBvN647fP1i8DEDoVNW3 (the drainer from Report #0135) produces two linked findings:

  1. A probable off-ramp into a specific Coinbase account has been identified, although the October 2025 stolen SOL batch has not yet been observed traversing it on-chain. In March 2026, deQzb forwarded funds to two intermediaries - CMKY and 6Mgca (March 20). 6Mgca independently deposits SOL into 4dfPa, which Arkham Intelligence labels as a Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet - an account-specific deposit address belonging to a single Coinbase user. The two observed 6Mgca → 4dfPa deposits (Mar 9 and Mar 17) predate the deQzb → 6Mgca transfer (Mar 20), so those specific deposits could not have carried the October 2025 stolen SOL. What the data does establish is that 6Mgca - a wallet that subsequently received stolen funds from deQzb - maintains an active deposit channel into this Coinbase user’s account. That makes this the single most plausible off-ramp for the stolen funds, pending observation of a post-March-20 6Mgca → 4dfPa transfer.
  2. The attacker is still active and controls a broader wallet cluster. In the 6 days to 2026-04-24, deQzb executed 5 transactions that seized SPL token balances via the Solana SPL Token program’s SetAuthority instruction, with a net retained USD value of +$8,530. Applying the SetAuthority signing rule proves that three additional wallets - 3ScNEE, HW66xmb, and Futbm - are under the attacker’s control. Combined with the March laundering path, six attacker-controlled wallets are now catalogued, plus one identified off-ramp (Coinbase).

Material of investigation

Attacker-controlled wallet cluster

Short name Address Role
deQzb deQzbGSDA3U6bFmxAfWuJYhYBvN647fP1i8DEDoVNW3 Primary drainer (Report #0135)
CMKY CMKY625CeWehSuqxSrZJiNibKP13FLmcovPorqxkdcxj Intermediary - received from deQzb Mar 2026
6Mgca 6MgcaeMYVfecgMe87UqY8PvtyHQ5FhjeC2XpuoPgyvPb Intermediary - received from deQzb; forwards to Coinbase
3ScNE 3ScNEE3m4bKy6NLiLDFu5rbHJj5eg4t4yk8tYNQoZ9Ad Signed SetAuthority to deQzb (Apr 2026)
HW66x HW66xmbLcqDyREHJDZkzSaygTJjLt6V3TcktipFosrqJ Signed SetAuthority to deQzb (Apr 2026)
Futbm Futbm4v55YL4AZhm8r11AfySMuUjVujWHRWWYpE63aFu Signed SetAuthority to deQzb (Apr 2026)

Identified off-ramp

Short name Address Role
4dfPa 4dfPaYTyCyuKKqMyp9Riy84oJmbykceUFBAvRn9d9XSr Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet (Arkham label) - probable off-ramp

Part 1 - Laundering path: deQzb → 6Mgca → 4dfPa [Coinbase]

Fund-flow timeline

6Mgca ──→ 4dfPa [Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet]  (Mar  9, 2026 19:51 UTC)  ← predates the attacker distribution
6Mgca ──→ 4dfPa [Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet]  (Mar 17, 2026 20:14 UTC)  ← predates the attacker distribution
deQzb (attacker) ──→ CMKY                           (Mar 20, 2026 05:39 UTC)
deQzb (attacker) ──→ 6Mgca                          (Mar 20, 2026 05:50 UTC)

The two 6Mgca → 4dfPa deposits occur before 6Mgca receives from deQzb on March 20. They establish 6Mgca’s Coinbase deposit channel but cannot themselves carry the October 2025 stolen SOL. A post-March-20 6Mgca → 4dfPa transfer - not yet observed in the available data - is required to prove the specific stolen batch reached Coinbase.

1.1 Attacker wallet distributes stolen funds (March 20, 2026)

The attacker wallet deQzb made 2 outgoing transfers on the same day, 11 minutes apart - a coordinated distribution:

Timestamp (UTC) From To Tx signature
1 2026-03-20 05:39:29 deQzb CMKY 4HLVP9P8fsiN…
2 2026-03-20 05:50:30 deQzb 6Mgca 3rKsPrSisR5f…
-- BigQuery: outgoing transfers from the attacker wallet
SELECT source, destination, block_timestamp, tx_signature
FROM `bigquery-public-data.crypto_solana_mainnet_us.Token Transfers`
WHERE source = 'deQzbGSDA3U6bFmxAfWuJYhYBvN647fP1i8DEDoVNW3'
  AND block_timestamp >= TIMESTAMP('2023-01-01')
ORDER BY block_timestamp ASC;

1.2 6Mgca forwards to the Coinbase deposit wallet 4dfPa

6Mgca sent two transfers to 4dfPa on March 9 and March 17, 2026 - before receiving its own transfer from deQzb on March 20. The ordering means 6Mgca was already operating as an intermediary with an established deposit channel, not a freshly spun-up burn wallet.

Timestamp (UTC) From To Tx signature
1 2026-03-09 19:51:10 6Mgca 4dfPa 4tAq2uLGqx7R…
2 2026-03-17 20:14:10 6Mgca 4dfPa 4C3YgKKsq5mj…
-- BigQuery: transfers from 6Mgca to 4dfPa
SELECT source, destination, block_timestamp, tx_signature
FROM `bigquery-public-data.crypto_solana_mainnet_us.Token Transfers`
WHERE source = '6MgcaeMYVfecgMe87UqY8PvtyHQ5FhjeC2XpuoPgyvPb'
  AND destination = '4dfPaYTyCyuKKqMyp9Riy84oJmbykceUFBAvRn9d9XSr'
  AND block_timestamp >= TIMESTAMP('2023-01-01')
ORDER BY block_timestamp ASC;

1.3 4dfPa is labelled a Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet

The address 4dfPaYTyCyuKKqMyp9Riy84oJmbykceUFBAvRn9d9XSr is labelled by Arkham Intelligence as a Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet. Personal deposit wallets on Coinbase are assigned to a single account holder, so the two March 2026 deposits from 6Mgca were credited to one specific Coinbase user.

What is and isn’t proven

Once funds reach a Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet, on-chain tracing stops being meaningful: any subsequent movements belong to Coinbase’s internal consolidation infrastructure. Further identification of the account holder would require legal process to Coinbase.

BigQuery confirms that no reverse transfers from 6Mgca, CMKY, or 4dfPa ever returned to deQzb - the observed flow is strictly one-directional.


Part 2 - Ongoing SPL token seizures via SetAuthority (April 2026)

Unlike the October 2025 attack - which drained only native SOL - the April 2026 activity uses a different on-chain primitive: SetAuthority to seize the owner authority of SPL token accounts.

2.1 Activity in the 6 days to 2026-04-24

Metric Value
Total transactions 5
SET OWNER AUTHORITY events (inbound) 3
TRANSFER events (outbound) 2
Total USD inflow value $19,389.42
Total USD outflow value $10,859.11
Net USD retained +$8,530.31
Distinct SPL token mints involved 3
Distinct counterparty addresses 3

2.2 Transaction detail

Timestamp (UTC) Action Flow Counterparty Amount Token mint USD value Tx
1 2026-04-19 02:00:23 SET OWNER AUTHORITY in 3ScNEE3m4bKy… 17,094.41 3k5z8WWX…afN $5,964.46 64e1pf9wew2o…
2 2026-04-20 18:33:07 TRANSFER out 3ScNEE3m4bKy… 17,094.41 3k5z8WWX…afN $5,975.66 5uUty1AnuJ7B…
3 2026-04-23 12:31:18 SET OWNER AUTHORITY in HW66xmbLcqDy… 29,570.00 GM9WxQp…d5DD $4,875.90 2io9VbDHyty4…
4 2026-04-24 00:43:43 TRANSFER out HW66xmbLcqDy… 29,570.00 GM9WxQp…d5DD $4,883.45 vNyhzwSeLb8r…
5 2026-04-24 08:06:03 SET OWNER AUTHORITY in Futbm4v55YL4… 506,617.00 3tWGSt…BY2V $8,549.06 2XSz5Y7uWeEu…

2.3 Observations

2.4 Attribution: 3ScNEE, HW66xmb, Futbm are attacker-controlled

The SPL Token program’s SetAuthority instruction has a strict authorization rule: only the current authority of a token account can sign a transaction that changes the authority. The instruction is defined in the Solana SPL Token program and requires a signed instruction from the existing authority - the new authority does not need to sign or approve.

Event Previous authority New authority Who had to sign
2026-04-19 3ScNEE3m4bKy… deQzb… 3ScNEE3m4bKy… had to sign
2026-04-23 HW66xmbLcqDy… deQzb… HW66xmbLcqDy… had to sign
2026-04-24 Futbm4v55YL4… deQzb… Futbm4v55YL4… had to sign

For each of the three transactions to land on-chain, the private key of 3ScNEE, HW66xmb, and Futbm respectively had to sign. Therefore one of the following is true for each counterparty:

  1. The attacker controls the private key of that address (directly or via prior key compromise). In either case the address is under attacker control.
  2. The address’s owner voluntarily handed over authority to a publicly-known drainer wallet. Ruled implausible - deQzb has been publicly flagged as a SOL drainer since October 2025 and is searchable on Solscan and Arkham; no rational legitimate counterparty would knowingly transfer token ownership to it.

Supporting the attacker-controlled interpretation:

Conclusion: 3ScNEE3m4bKy6NLiLDFu5rbHJj5eg4t4yk8tYNQoZ9Ad, HW66xmbLcqDyREHJDZkzSaygTJjLt6V3TcktipFosrqJ, and Futbm4v55YL4AZhm8r11AfySMuUjVujWHRWWYpE63aFu are, with high confidence, either additional wallets operated by the same attacker or wallets whose private keys the attacker has compromised. Operationally the distinction does not matter - the attacker signs for all of them.

2.5 SPL token mints seen in this window

Token mint Total flow (USD)
3k5z8WWX6TkpgvDwwr2jDEAaMMwxX56Kj2Xs6HFRjafN $11,940.12
GM9WxQpAi1SwPnc8YGyojZCFHxoCjp4AAzSQEQfQd5DD $9,759.35
3tWGStNsYF2VihjBPBv4BpZufoY7iJKbCejnPUatBY2V $8,549.06 (inbound only so far)

Findings

At the evidence thresholds in Editorial Standards § 1:

Laundering path (Part 1):

Ongoing activity and wallet cluster (Part 2):

Combined attacker cluster

Six attacker-controlled wallets are now catalogued: deQzb, CMKY, 6Mgca, 3ScNE, HW66x, Futbm. One off-ramp is identified: 4dfPa (Coinbase Personal Deposit Wallet).

This investigation is ongoing. Further updates will be logged here as additional transactions are observed.

Right of reply

If you are a party associated with any wallet in this report and believe a claim is inaccurate, please submit via Corrections. Any response received will be published at the end of this report.

This report is based on verifiable public blockchain data. It is not a criminal allegation against any natural person. See the Disclaimer.